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 ﺍﻻﺳﻡ: ﺳﻭﻟﻲ ﺷﺎﺭﻟﻳﺱ ﺍﺩﻳﻧﻳﻪ 
 ﻣﺻﺎﺩﻗﺔ ﻟﻌﻣﻠﻳﺔ ﺗﺧﺻﻳﺹ ﺍﻟﻌﻧﻭﺍﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻬﻣﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺷﺑﻛﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺻﺩﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﺳﺎﺩﺱ ﻟﺑﺭﻭﺗﻭﻛﻭﻝ ﺍﻻﻧﺗﺭﻧﺕ   ﺍﻟﻌﻧﻭﺍﻥ:  
 ﺍﻟﺗﺧﺻﺹ: ﻫﻧﺩﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﺣﺎﺳﻭﺏ ﺍﻻﻟﻲ
  ﻫﺟﺭﻱ3341 ﺭﺑﻳﻊ ﺍﻷﻭﻝ، 28ﺍﻟﺗﺎﺭﻳﺦ: 
 
ﺍﻻﺻﺩﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﺳﺎﺩﺱ ﻣﻥ ﺑﺭﻭﺗﻭﻛﻭﻝ ﺍﻻﻧﺗﺭﻧﺕ ﻫﻭ ﺑﺭﻭﺗﻭﻛﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺟﻳﻝ ﺍﻟﺟﺩﻳﺩ ﻣﻥ ﺑﺭﻭﺗﻭﻛﻭﻻﺕ ﺍﻻﻧﺗﺭﻧﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺣﻝ ﺍﻟﻌﺩﻳﺩ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻭﺟﻪ 
ﺍﻟﻘﺻﻭﺭ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻻﺻﺩﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﺭﺍﺑﻊ ﻣﻥ ﺑﺭﻭﺗﻭﻛﻭﻝ ﺍﻻﻧﺗﺭﻧﺕ ﺍﻟﺣﺎﻟﻲ. ﻫﻧﺎﻟﻙ ﺑﻌﺽ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺳﻳﻧﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻻﺻﺩﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﺳﺎﺩﺱ ﺑﺎﻟﻣﻘﺎﺭﻧﺔ ﻣﻊ 
ﺍﻻﺻﺩﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﺭﺍﺑﻊ ﻣﻥ ﺣﻳﺙ ﺣﺟﻡ ﺍﻟﻌﻧﻭﺍﻥ، ﻭﺍﻷﻣﻥ، ﻭﺗﻭﻓﻳﺭ ﺍﻻﻋﺩﺍﺩﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﻠﻘﺎﺋﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﻧﺎﻭﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻬﻣﻠﺔ ﺑﺣﻳﺙ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﻘﺩ ﺍﻟﺟﺩﻳﺩﺓ ﺗﻘﻭﻡ 
ﺑﺗﺷﻛﻳﻝ ﺍﻟﻌﻧﻭﺍﻥ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺹ ﺑﻬﺎ ﻣﻥ ﺩﻭﻥ ﻣﺳﺎﻋﺩﺓ ﺧﺎﺩﻡ ﺑﺭﻭﺗﻭﻛﻭﻝ ﺍﻻﻋﺩﺍﺩﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﻠﻘﺎﺋﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻣﺿﻳﻑ، ﻭﻣﻥ ﺩﻭﻥ ﺍﻻﻋﺩﺍﺩﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻳﺩﻭﻳﺔ 
ﻟﻣﺳﺅﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺷﺑﻛﺔ. ﻓﻲ ﺣﻳﻥ ﺃﻥ ﻧﻬﺞ ﺍﻻﻋﺩﺍﺩﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﻠﻘﺎﺋﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﻬﻣﻠﺔ ﻳﺳﻣﺢ ﺑﺎﻟﺗﻭﺻﻳﻝ ﺍﻟﺗﻠﻘﺎﺋﻲ ﻟﻠﻌﻘﺩﺓ، ﻭﻳﺿﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺗﻭﺻﻳﻝ ﺍﻟﺗﻠﻘﺎﺋﻲ ﻣﻊ 
ﺍﻟﻌﻘﺩ ﺍﻷﺧﺭﻯ ﻭﻳﻠﻐﻲ ﺗﻛﻠﻔﺔ ﺷﺭﺍء ﻭﺗﺻﻠﻳﺢ ﺧﺎﺩﻡ ﺑﺭﻭﺗﻭﻛﻭﻝ ﺍﻻﻋﺩﺍﺩﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﻠﻘﺎﺋﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻣﺿﻳﻑ. ﻭﻛﺫﻟﻙ ﻳﻔﺗﺢ ﻓﺭﺹ ﻟﻠﻌﻘﺩ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺑﻭﻫﺔ  
ﺑﻌﺩﻡ ﺍﻟﺳﻣﺎﺡ ﻟﻠﻌﻘﺩ ﺍﻟﺟﺩﻳﺩﺓ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻻﺗﺻﺎﻝ ﺑﺎﻟﺷﺑﻛﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﻫﻭ ﺷﻛﻝ ﻣﻥ ﺃﺷﻛﺎﻝ ﺍﻟﺣﺭﻣﺎﻥ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺧﺩﻣﺔ. ﻓﻲ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻷﻁﺭﻭﺣﺔ، ﺇﻧﻧﺎ ﻧﻘﺗﺭﺡ 
ﺍﺛﻧﻳﻥ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺗﻘﻧﻳﺎﺕ ﺗﺳﻣﺢ ﻟﻠﻌﻘﺩ ﺍﻟﺟﺩﻳﺩﺓ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻻﺻﺩﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﺳﺎﺩﺱ ﻣﻥ ﺑﺭﻭﺗﻭﻛﻭﻝ ﺍﻻﻧﺗﺭﻧﺕ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺗﺄﻛﺩ ﻣﻥ ﺣﺻﻭﻟﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﻧﻭﺍﻥ ﻓﺭﻳﺩ، 
ﺑﺣﻳﺙ ﻳﺗﻡ ﺫﻟﻙ ﺑﻁﺭﻳﻘﺔ ﻻﻣﺭﻛﺯﻳﺔ. ﺍﻟﺗﻘﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻷﻭﻟﻰ ﺗﺳﺗﺧﺩﻡ ﻁﺭﻳﻘﺔ ﺗﺄﻛﻳﺩ ﺍﻟﺛﻘﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﺧﺩﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻧﻅﻳﺭﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻧﻅﻳﺭ ﻟﻠﺗﻌﺭﻑ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻌﻘﺩ 
ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺑﻭﻫﺔ. ﺑﻳﻧﻣﺎ ﺍﻟﺗﻘﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻧﻳﺔ ﺗﻌﺗﻣﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺇﺧﻔﺎء ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻠﻭﻣﺎﺕ. ﺍﻟﺗﻘﻧﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﻘﺗﺭﺣﺔ ﻻ ﺗﻌﺗﻣﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﻭﺍﺩﻡ ﺗﺄﻛﻳﺩ ﻣﺭﻛﺯﻳﺔ، ﻭﻗﺩ ﺃﺛﺑﺗﺕ 
ﻓﻌﺎﻟﻳﺔ ﻋﺎﻟﻳﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻧﺳﺑﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﻘﺩ ﺍﻟﺟﺩﻳﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺣﺎﻭﻝ ﺍﻻﻧﺿﻣﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﺷﺑﻛﺔ، ﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﺣﺩ ﺍﻷﺩﻧﻰ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺯﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻼﺯﻡ ﻹﺗﻣﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻠﻳﺔ. ﻭﻫﺫﺍ ﻣﺎ 
 ﺳﻭﻑ ﻳﺗﻡ ﺑﻳﺎﻧﻪ ﻣﻥ ﺧﻼﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺣﺎﻛﺎﺓ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﺣﻠﻳﻝ. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Internet Protocols 
The idea of Internet Protocols was conceived in the mid-1970s at the Defence Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) when there was a need in building a packet-
switched network that would enable communication between dissimilar computer 
systems at research institutions.   The Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) which had 
hitherto served as the core of the present Internet was specified in [RFC791] and mainly 
functions to provide connectionless, best-effort delivery of datagram through an 
internetwork [27].  It also provides fragmentation and reassembly of datagram to support 
data links having different maximum transmission unit (MTU) sizes.   The IPv4 which is 
based on 32-bit address format, has a packet structure illustrated in Figure 1.1 
 
Version IHL Type of Service Total length 
Identification Flags Fragment offset 
Time-to-live Protocol Header checksum 
Source Address 
Destination Address 
Options (+ padding) 
Data (variable) 
 
Fig. 1.1 Structure of an IPv4 Packet 
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1.2 The IPv6 Protocol 
Specified in the [RFC2460] [1] and designed to address the shortcomings in IPv4, the 
Internet Protocol version 6, so-called “the next-generation internet protocol” or IPng 
provides a more flexible and powerful framework upon which next generation network 
applications and services would be deployed [2].   One of the main drivers for designing 
the new protocol was the shrinking of address space in IPv4, which was designed in the 
early 80’s and had laid the foundation for the Internet.  However, the IPv4 protocol was 
based on 32 bits and could only provide 232
 
 (or 4.3 billion) IP addresses, which were 
projected to be used up by Internet hosts in the next few years.  While IP address 
conserving techniques such as Network address translation (NAT) and Classless Inter-
domain Routing (CIDR) have served the internet community in prolonging the time when 
the whole address space would be fully consumed, analysts have argued that NAT 
operation is antithetical to the end-to-end principle of data transfer in the internet.  In 
addition, the NAT’s philosophy does not encourage the proliferation of applications (such 
as P2P) that require that communication nodes are fully transparent to one another. 
1.3 IPv6 Features 
1.3.1 Increased Address Space   
The IPv6 protocol design, on the other hand, is based on 128 bits and provides up to 2128 
(or 3.4 x 1038) addresses, a huge address space that is more than adequate for both today’s 
and future’s hosts and application needs.  The avalanche of IPv6 addresses eliminates the 
need for NAT, maintains the end-to-end data transfer principle [3], as well as supports at 
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low cost, P2P, VoIP and videoconferencing applications all of which do not fare well 
with NAT. 
IPv6 Address Format 
While IPv4 addresses are represented in four fields of decimal numbers, in the range 0 to 
255, each number representing 8 bits (e.g. 192.168.0.10, 10.1.9.242 etc), addresses in 
IPv6 are represented using hexadecimal notation to allow for larger number of IP address 
representation.  In addition, the hexadecimal scheme compresses the representation of 
addresses better - It uses 8 fields of hexadecimal numbers (0-F), each field delineated 
with a colon symbol, and represents 16 bits using 4 hexadecimal digits [29].  For 
example, 2002:1234:0000:ACBD:2054:0000:0000:0B15 is a valid IPv6 address. 
 
IPv6 addressing is also guided with some rules which are – (i) hexadecimal letters are not 
case-sensitive, for instance, ‘ACBD’ denotes ‘acbd’ (ii) leading zeros in a field are 
optional, for example, ‘0B15’ denotes ‘b15’ (iii) successive fields of zeros are 
represented as ‘::’, but this appears only once in an address, for example, the full IPv6 
address above can also be written as  2002:1234:0:acbd:2054::b15. 
 
 [RFC4291] specifies three forms of addresses in IPv6 protocol – Unicast, Anycast and 
Multicast: 
i. Unicast Address – A unicast address refers to a single interface of a node and 
packet sent to this address is only received by this interface.  An important 
example of unicast address is the global unicast address which all nodes use in 
communicating on the Internet.  The global unicast address use the address range 
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of 2000:: to 3fff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff.  All of these addresses have 001 as 
the leftmost bits. 
The basic structure of an IPv6 address is depicted as shown in Figure 1.2 below: 
Prefix from provider 
(48 bits) 
Site subnets 
(16 bits) 
Host part: Interface Identifier 
(64 bits) 
 
Fig. 1.2 Structure of an IPv6 address 
 
As shown, the 48-bit leftmost part of the address represents the prefix allocated by 
the provider to a site.  The middle 16 bits represents the number of subnets in a 
site – this means that an IPv6 network site can have a maximum of 216 subnets.  
The 64-bit rightmost part is the length of the interface identifier, which identifies 
a host in a subnet. An IPv6 subnet can have up to 264 
A Scoped address is another form of unicast address and it is of two types – Link-
local scope and site-local scope.  The link-local addresses can only be used 
between nodes connected on the same link and are never forwarded by a router.  
A link-local address is represented by fe80:0:0:0:<interface identifier> as shown 
in Figure 1.3 
addresses. 
 
 
 Fe80 
(16 bits) 
0 
(48 bits) 
Interface Identifier 
(64 bits) 
 
Fig. 1.3 Format of a link-local address 
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An IPv6-enabled interface has a link-local address automatically configured.  This 
enables it to communicate with other nodes on the same link. 
ii. Anycast Address – An anycast address refers to a group of interfaces.  Packets 
sent to an anycast address are received by one of the interfaces in the group 
(usually the nearest one).  An anycast address can only be used as a destination 
address and starts with the prefix of the target network, followed by the host part 
that identifies the anycast group. 
iii. Multicast Address – A multicast address also refers to a group of addresses.  
However, packets sent to a multicast address would be delivered to all the 
interfaces in the group [28].  The format of a multicast address is ff<L><S>::/16 
is illustrated in Figure 1.4.  L bit is the lifetime of the multicast group and the S 
bit denotes the scope.  The lifetime field enables us to specify a multicast address 
as temporary such as one-hour videoconference, or permanent use like an address 
identifying all routers on a link. 
FF 
(8) 
L 
(4) 
S 
(4) 
Multicast group identifier 
(112 bits) 
 
Fig. 1.4 Format of a IPv6 multicast address 
 
A value of 0 (0000) in the ‘L’ field indicates ‘permanent’ group while a value 1 
(0001) denotes ‘temporary’ multicast group.  The different values allowed in the 
scope field and what they represent is illustrated in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1  Scope bits in a multicast address 
Value of S (binary) Value of S (hex) Scope 
0001 1 Interface 
0010 2 Link 
0100 4 Admin 
0101 5 Site 
1000 8 Organisation 
1110 E Global 
Others  Reserved 
 
Broadcast address is extensively used in IPv4 for many things.  IPv6 discontinues 
the use of broadcast and uses multicast instead.  This is to encourage the efficient 
use of network bandwidth since datagram sent to nodes in a multicast group is 
received and processed by all nodes, unlike in a broadcast where some or many 
nodes may not be intended recipients of the datagram.  Figure 1.5 shows the 
packet header of an IPv6 packet 
Version 
(4 bits) 
Traffic class 
(8 bits) 
Flow label 
(20 bits) 
Payload length 
(16 bits) 
Next header 
(8 bits) 
Hop limit 
(8 bits) 
Source address 
(128 bits) 
Destination address 
(128 bits) 
Data payload 
 
 
Fig. 1.5 – IPv6 Packet header structure 
 
 
 7 
 
1.3.2 Address Auto-Configuration & Host Discovery 
IPv6 provides a means for network devices to initialise their interfaces and start 
communicating with peer nodes without the need for a server or static configuration.  In 
addition, IPv6 comes with a very crucial protocol - the neighbour discovery protocol 
(NDP) which allows a node to discover neighbouring nodes and routers [51].  Besides 
host discovery function, the NDP also performs a number of functions such as address 
resolution, redirection, and neighbour unreachability detection. 
 
1.3.3 Mandatory Security   
The IPv4 was initially designed with no security consideration in mind.  The provision of 
security is therefore the responsibility of higher layer protocols (i.e. transport and 
application layers).  Although this design worked well some years after the initial 
introduction of the IPv4, however today’s security threats that exist in the Internet such as 
denial-of-service attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, malicious code distribution, 
reconnaissance attacks etc have proved this IPv4 security model inadequate.  The IPSec 
is a suite of cryptographic protocols whose use is mandatory in IPv6, but not in IPv4.  
The IPSec protocol suite comprises: 
i. Authentication Header (AH) protocol, which allows for authentication and 
integrity of data. 
ii. Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol, which enables 
authentication, integrity as well as privacy of data. 
iii. Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol, which helps in initially setting up 
and negotiating security parameters between two end points.  It also keeps 
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track of this information so that communication stays secure till the end. 
  
1.3.4 Optimized Header   
A number of factors account for why the header structure of an IPv6 datagram is much 
simpler and efficient than that of IPv4.  First, the number of fields in the header is less 
than that of IPv4 which reduces the processing time intermediate routers would have to 
spend on headers.  Second, the option field appears after the base header which means 
that routers would not need spending time to compute the checksum needed to verify 
packet integrity.  And third, the extension header allows for more flexible inclusion of 
protocols than what IPv4 can offer.    
   
 
1.3.5 Quality of Service 
The 8-bit Traffic Class and 20-bit Flow Label headers provide the quality of service 
requirements in IPv6.   While the Traffic Class header is used originating nodes and / or 
forwarding routers in identifying and distinguishing IPv6 packets from different classes 
or priorities (doing essentially the same function as a Type of Service header in IPv4, the 
Flow Label field defines the packets of the flow.  The main benefit of the Flow Label is 
that intermediate routers do not have to open the inner packet to identify the flow, but 
only check the flow identification fields, source address and flow label, to direct traffic as 
required [30]. 
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1.4 Configuration of Nodes’ Addresses in IPv6 Network 
A host in an IPv6 network can have an IP Address in one of three ways –  
i. static address configuration  
ii. stateless address auto-configuration, and  
iii. stateful (server-based) address auto-configuration [1][2].   
In static address configuration, the information used in configuring an IPv6 host is either 
obtained from a command line or from a static file.  This information typically comprise 
the IP address, prefix length, and DNS servers.  Similar to IPv4, this configuration 
method is used in giving addresses to routers and servers, which rarely change their 
addresses in the network. 
The stateful address auto-configuration technique uses a DHCP server, which provides a 
mechanism of passing reusable IPv6 addresses and other configuration parameters to 
network nodes [3]. 
The following list of terms are imperative to be able to have get a clear picture of how a 
node gets configured with an IPv6 address and other configuration parameters using the 
DHCPv6 server / client protocol. 
SOLICIT:  a Solicit message is typically sent by a client to locate DHCP servers. 
ADVERTISE:  an Advertise message is sent by a server to indicate that it is available for 
a DHCP service, and it is sent by a server in response to a Solicit message received from 
a client. 
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REQUEST:  a Request message is sent by a client to request configuration parameters, 
including IP addresses from a specific client. 
CONFIRM:  a Confirm message is sent to any available server by a client to verify that 
the addresses assigned to the client is still appropriate to the link to which the client is 
connected. 
RENEW:  a Renew message is sent to the server that originally provided the client’s 
addresses and configuration parameters in order to extend the lifetime on the client’s 
address and to also update other configuration parameters. 
REBIND:  a Rebind message is sent to any available server in order to extend the lifetime 
on the addresses assigned to the client and also update other configuration parameters.  A 
Rebind is sent after a client receives no response to a Renew message. 
REPLY:  A Reply message including assigned addresses and configuration parameters is 
sent by a server to a Solicit, Request, Renew, Rebind message received from a client.  A 
Reply message is sent in response to an Information-request message.  In Confirming / 
Denying that the addresses assigned to the client are appropriate to the client’s link.  The 
server also sends a reply message to the client. 
RELEASE:  a Release message is sent by a client to the server to indicate that the address 
assigned to it will no longer be used 
DECLINE:  If a client has determined that one or more addresses assigned to it by DHCP 
server is already in use on the client’s link, it sends a Decline message to the server. 
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RECONFIGURE:  The Reconfigure message is sent by the server to inform the client 
that the server has new or updated configuration parameters in order that the client can 
start a Renew / Reply or Information-request / Reply transaction to be able to receive 
updated information. 
INFORMATION-REQUEST:  This message is sent to a server by a client to request 
configuration parameters without the assignment of any IP addresses 
RELAY-FORW:  a Relay-forward message is sent by a relay agent to servers either 
directly or through another relay agent.  The received client message / relay-forward 
message is encapsulated in an option field in the relay-forward message 
RELAY-REPL:  a Relay-reply message containing a message that a relay-agent delivers 
to a client is sent to it by the DHCP server.  The message could be relayed by other relay 
agents for delivery to the destination relay agent  
The relay agent extracts client message encapsulated by the server as an option in the 
Relay-reply and relays it to the client 
A DHCP client may be configured using a DHCPv6 server in two network configurations 
– a network scenario in which the client shares the same link with the DHCP server and a 
scenario where the server and the client do not share the same link, which necessitates the 
use of a DHCP relay.  These scenarios are shown Figures 1.6 and 1.7 respectively.   
Typically, a client boots up in an IPv6 network generating its link-local address and sends 
a Network Discovery – Router Solicitation (ND RS) message to all-router multicast 
address FF02::2 to request for router advertisement (RA).  If the ‘Managed Configuration 
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Flag’ in the Router Advertisement packet is set or there is no router advertisement after 
several router solicit, the client proceeds to send a DHCP Solicit message to all-DHCP-
agents multicast address FF02::1:2 to locate the available DHCP servers. 
If a DHCP server is on the same link as the requesting client, the server responds with a 
DHCP Advertise message.  Else, a DHCP Relay forwards the Solicit message to any 
available DHCP server on the network site multicast address FF05::1::3.  A DHCP server 
responds to the client via the relay [4]. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.6 DHCP Server and Client  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.7 DHCP Client, Server and a Relay 
3. Solicit   5. Request 
1. ND 
 
2. ND RA 
4. Advertise 
6. Confirm 
Router 
DHCP 
 
DHCP 
 
DHC
P  
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1.5 Stateless Auto-configuration and Neighbour Discovery protocol 
Eliminating the need for a DHCPv6 client / server algorithm as employed in the stateful 
address auto-configuration described earlier, the stateless address auto-configuration is a 
technique in which IPv6 network nodes form their addresses from a combination of 
information they get from their interface address, and the subnet prefix of the link to 
which they are attached [5]. 
A crucial component of the stateless auto-configuration algorithm is the Neighbour 
Discovery (ND) protocol.  Implemented within the Internet Control Message protocol, 
the Neighbour Discovery protocol provides an enhanced functionality of IPv4’s Address 
Resolution Protocol (ARP), as well as allowing hosts to discover the neigbouring routers 
and a means of getting configuration information from them.  In addition, the ND 
protocol defines Neighbour Unreachability Detection mechanism, an algorithm that helps 
to determine when a neighbor becomes unreachable [6].   
Two pairs of messages are the key part of the Neighbour Discovery protocol.  One is 
neighbor solicitation (NS) and neighbor advertisement (NA) which helps in determining 
the link-layer address of neighbours, as well as verifying that a neighbor is reachable.  
The other pair is router solicitation (RS) and router advertisement (RA) both of which are 
employed in obtaining information from routers.  
 
1.6 Address formation using the Stateless Auto-configuration 
 A node’s interface is assigned an address using the stateless auto-configuration 
approach, in the following sequence: 
i. A node forms the link-local address  
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ii. The node ascertains the uniqueness of its link-local address by performing 
duplicate address detection (DAD) check. 
iii. The node obtains a network-prefix value from the neighboring routers 
iv. The node forms its global-site local address from the network-prefix 
information obtained from router advertisements. 
The node generates its link-local address by concatenating its link-local prefix FE80::/64 
bits with its 64 bits interface ID.  The 64-bit interface ID is generated from the node’s 48-
bit MAC address by inserting a 16-bit ‘FF-FE’ string in between the third byte and the 
fourth byte and then setting the uniqueness bit (the uniqueness bit is the second bit of the 
leftmost octet and it identifies the distinctiveness of the MAC address – it is typically set 
to 1 if the MAC address is unique).  For instance, an IPv6 node with a MAC address 00-
12-6B-3A-9E-9A would create a temporary link-local address by inserting FF-FE in the 
middle of the 48-bit MAC address, setting the uniqueness bit to give an interface ID of 
0212:6BFF:FE3A:9E9A, and concatenating the link-local prefix with the interface ID 
which results in link-local address of FE80::0212:6BFF:FE3A:9E9A.  This is illustrated 
in Figure 1.8.  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.8 Formation of link-local address 
00-12-6B-3A-9E-9A 
00-12-6B-FF-FE-3A-9E-
 
02-12-6B-FF-FE-3A-9E-
 
 
0212:6BFF:FE3A:9E9A 
 FE80::0212:6BFF:FE3A:
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1.7 Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) 
In order to confirm that the assigned link-local address is unique, and hence the usability 
of the address on the local link, the node undergoes a duplicate address detection process 
by sending a message to the corresponding solicited-node multicast address.  This 
solicited-node multicast address is formed by concatenating a fixed leftmost of 104 bits 
with 24 bits that is taken from the rightmost part of the link-address.  Thus, the solicited-
node multicast address for FE80::0212:6BFF:FE3A:9E9A is FF02::1:FF3A:9E9A.  If 
there is a neighbor advertisement (NA) response to this neighbor solicitation message, 
this indicates that the link-local address is already in use by another node and cannot be 
used by the soliciting node.  Duplicate addresses should not be experienced very often 
during the auto-configuration process since the interface identifier, which forms part of 
the address, is obtained from a unique MAC address. 
However, if the IPv6 node does not get a neighbor advertisement message in response to 
its neighbor solicitation message, it proceeds to obtain network-prefix information by 
sending a router solicitation (RS) message to all the routers on its link on the destination 
multicast address FF02::2.  The router advertisement (RA) containing the network prefix 
is sent by the routers (for example, with a prefix 3FFE:A00:1::/64 in the source address) 
to the all-nodes multicast FF02::1 (all-nodes multicast address).  Thus, the new node can 
form its globally-unique address by appending the network-prefix information to its 
interface identifier.  The globally-unique address can be used by the node to 
communicate on the internet.  This is illustrated in Figures 1.9 and 1.10. 
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Fig. 1.9: Formation of global site address with Router Solicitation and Advertisement 
messages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.10 Auto-configuration process - formation of link-local & globally unique address 
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Many reasons have contributed to the success of stateless auto-configuration in the IPv6 
protocol.  Besides the fact that it is a means of reducing the operational and deployment 
cost of the overall network because many nodes can be self-configured, it is also making 
the network user-friendly for inexperienced users [7][8].    
Despite the success of the stateless auto-configuration technique, it has some security 
implications when used in an IPv6 network.  These are duplicate address detection attack 
Denial of Service attack, Man-in-the-middle attack, Sniffing, bogus-on-link prefix attack 
and parameter spoofing attack [9-11]. 
 
1.8 Motivation and Objectives of the Thesis 
The motivation for this thesis is to identify the security vulnerabilities that impact the 
availability of services using IPv6 protocol suite.  In particular, we develop and 
implement algorithms for preventing denial of service (DoS) that a node booting up in an 
IPv6 network might experience during the process of stateless address auto-
configuration.  We achieve this by defining a simulation model to test the scalability and 
effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. Finally, we collect and analyze the results from 
the simulations.  We outline the objectives of this work as follows: 
i. To identify vulnerabilities that will affect the availability of services using the 
IPv6 protocol suite, 
ii. To formulate mechanisms / algorithms for preventing loss of services / Denial of 
Service based on node identification and verification, 
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iii. Define a simulation model to test the scalability and effectiveness of the proposed 
solutions, and 
iv. Analyze results from the simulations. 
 
1.9 Thesis Methodology 
The whole thesis is broken down to phases, each of which has to be accomplished in 
order to achieve the above objectives.  These phases are:  
i. To conduct a literature survey on IPv6 
ii. To conduct a literature survey on peer-to-peer node verification protocol 
iii. To conduct a literature survey on attack model for IPv6 
iv. Proposal / formulation of a mechanism for preventing DoS attacks in IPv6 
v. Simulation test-bed setup using appropriate tools such as MATLAB, OPNET etc 
vi. Analysis of simulation results    
 
1.10 Contributions of the Thesis 
The thesis contributions are as follows: 
i. Literature survey on the IPv6 protocol including the features, addressing 
architecture, stateless address auto-configuration and duplicate address 
detection. 
ii. Security vulnerabilities common to IPv4 and IPv6 protocols 
iii. Security vulnerabilities specific to IPv6 protocol. 
iv.  Stateless address auto-configuration attack model in IPv6 
v. Literature survey on Trust and Reputation 
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vi. Trust algorithm proposal for solving stateless address auto-configuration 
attack in IPv6 networks 
vii. MSB / LSB (Information hiding) algorithm proposal for solving stateless 
address auto-configuration   
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND, TERMINOLOGY AND LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
2.1 SECURITY ISSUES COMMON TO IPv4 AND IPv6  
 
2.1.1 Sniffing Attacks 
This class of threat entails capturing of data being transmitted in a network [42].  Packets 
being conveyed in plain texts are susceptible and can be examined by an adversary in 
order to obtain very sensitive information such as login credentials [43].  TCPdump, a 
tool which comes with UNIX and most UNIX-like operating systems is often used in 
carrying out this kind of attack.  While the use of IPSec may be promising in alleviating 
sniffing in networks, simplification of key management for IPSec still remains challenge.  
 
2.1.2 Application-layer Attacks 
Application layer attack is carried out by exploiting the weaknesses in the application 
layer and as such it accounts for the bulk of threats existing on the Internet today [44].  
Some of the common examples in this attack category are web server attacks, malicious 
(including viruses, and Trojans), SQL injection attacks, buffer overflows, cross-site 
scripting, etc.  Even with transition to IPv6, there may be a very little change in 
application layer threats.  This is because an attack initiated at this layer can still traverse 
an encrypted link and still cause damage in the same manner as when the link were in the 
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clear [45].  Moreover, layer 3 devices such as firewalls and IDS may not guarantee 
security when they see encrypted traffic. 
 
2.1.3 Rogue Devices 
These are devices such as wireless access point; DHCP or DNS server, router or switch 
introduced into the network and are not authorized [17][46].  If IPSec is used, it could 
help in reducing the level of attack by a rogue device since every device introduced into 
the network would need to be authenticated. 
 
2.1.4 Man-in-the-Middle Attacks 
The absence of proper authentication mechanism in IPv4 and IPv6 headers gives room 
for man-in-the middle attacks.  By staying in the middle between a customer and a web-
based transaction, an adversary can act as proxy, intercept all communications, observe 
and modify transactions [47]. 
Single-factor authentication such as the usage of username and password have proved 
inadequate in avoiding this kind of threat in the Internet and as such multifactor 
authentication such as a the use of hardware tokens, challenge-response, machine 
fingerprinting and tagging etc are being used to eliminate man-in-the-middle attacks. 
 
2.1.5 Flooding Attacks 
In flooding attack, network devices such as routers or nodes (PCs and servers) and 
network services are bombarded with large amount of illegitimate requests so as to make 
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the targeted device or service unable to process such large amount of network traffic and 
therefore becoming unavailable to legitimate users or requests – a situation often termed 
denial of service (DOS).  One of the most prominent examples of network-based DOS 
attacks is TCP SYN flooding in which an adversary sends a huge amount of special TCP 
packets to a victim in order to exhaust its processing resources [48][49].  Other forms of 
DOS employ huge HTTP requests initiated from large number hosts (referred to as bots) 
to a targeted host or server in the Internet.  A number of approaches have been proposed 
to alleviate the problem of flooding in the Internet.  One of these proposals is in [50] in 
which clients making requests to a server are filtered and authenticated based on their 
requests, and authenticated clients are issued tickets depending on which services the 
client can receive.  This way, only legitimate requests are accepted to be processed by the 
targeted host. 
 2.2 SECURITY VULNERABILITIES SPECIFIC TO IPV6 
As we alluded to earlier, IPv6 is not a superset of IPv4.  Rather, it is a new suite of 
protocols within which the support of IPSec for security at the network layer is 
mandatory.   And, in spite of the great number of features which allow it to simplify and 
enhance IPv4, some of its features and issues related to its deployment have raised some 
genuine security concerns. 
First of all, the fact that the support for IPSec is compulsory in IPv6 but its use is not 
[12], may create avenues that can predispose an IPv6 network infrastructure to malicious 
activities of hackers, if the IPSec feature is not used.  Second, the current Internet is still 
largely running on IPv4 and it would probably take some time before there can be a 
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complete shift to IPv6.  During the period of IPv4-IPv6 migration, both networks would 
coexist, and some of the approaches used during this transition such as Dual-stack 
backbones, IPv6-over-IPv4, protocol translation etc. [13-15] might probably be exploited 
by attackers. 
Some of the attacks that IPv6 network can experience are: 
2.2.1 Reconnaissance 
In this form of threat, an attacker first gathers some vital information about the network 
and then uses the information collected to launch an attack.  Ping probes may be 
employed to determine what range of IP addresses are being used in the victim’s 
network.  Having identified the hosts connected to the victim’s network via probing, the 
attacker may proceed to do a port scanning in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the 
application and / or services running on each host.  Because of the huge number of hosts 
present in an IPv6 network subnet, host probing should present a very difficult task for an 
attacker [16].  However, the multicast addressing structure in IPv6 networks could make 
key devices such as DHCP servers, routers, and nodes etc easy targets of an attacker’s 
diabolical activities  
 
2.2.2 Host Initialization 
A host trying to generate an IP address for itself using the stateless auto-configuration 
technique may be barred from forming such address in the presence of an attacker in the 
network.  After creating its link-local address by appending the link-local prefix 
(FE80::/64) to its interface identifier, the host checks the uniqueness of the address by 
undergoing the duplicate address detection (DAD) via sending a neighbor solicitation 
 24 
 
(NS) message to all the nodes on the local link.   The absence of neighbor advertisement 
(NA) message as a response to the node’s NS message guarantees that the link-local 
address generated by the upcoming node is distinctive and as such the host can use it. 
However, the presence of an attacker on the node’s local link would frustrate the address 
formation process - The attacker, as shown in Figure 2.1, sends an NA message in 
response to the NS message coming from the upcoming host which makes the host to 
form another link-local address and undergo the DAD process again.  In the end, the 
upcoming node may give up and would not initialize its interface [5][17].   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.1: Host Initialization Attack 
 
2.2.3 Routing Headers 
Routing headers are a means for an IPv6 node to list the addresses of intermediate nodes 
that its packets need to pass through when the node is sending message to a destination 
[18].  Normal hosts in an IPv6 could accept packets from an attacker because if the hosts 
are listed in the attacker’s routing header.  These malicious packets could further be 
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forwarded to other trusted nodes and the process continues.  This scenario may eventually 
cause resources to be used up quickly at the routers, hence leading to a DoS attack.  
 
2.2.4 Multicast-based Attacks 
The use of broadcast address in IPv4 has been discontinued in IPv6.  Instead, IPv6 uses 
the multicast-addressing scheme a lot.  Messages are sent to a group of nodes, routers, 
DHCP servers etc using their respective multicast addresses. 
In an IPv6 network having a malicious node, messages that are being sent to a multicast 
address could be intercepted and modified by the malicious node so as to enable it gather 
information that could enable it to know important systems on the network which could 
be the target of attacks [5][24]. 
 
2.2.5 Transition Issues 
The transition to IPv6 from the present IPv4 would be gradual.  Some of the approaches 
being proposed for this migration are Dual-Stack approach whereby nodes incorporate 
the two protocols and use the appropriate one for communication, for example, most 
PCs’ operating systems today have both IPv4 and IPv6 protocol stacks; Translation 
approach, by which a protocol can be converted to another protocol; and Tunneling 
approach, by which IPv6 protocol is overlaid over a legacy IPv4.  The IPv6 datagram is 
typically encapsulated inside the payload of the IPv4 datagram, whereby the IPv4 source 
and destination addresses of the IPv4 datagram are the addresses of the encapsulation and 
de-capsulation node [7].   
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These migration approaches, however, are prone to security challenges.  For example, in 
dual-stack technique, there is a need for parallel infrastructure with the added security 
problems of both protocols.  Managing two separate protocols may provide an 
opportunity for attack [37].   
 
2.2.6 Other Security Issues 
There are other security challenges in IPv6 network such as Application layer attacks, 
which are a broad category of threats at layer 7 of TCP/IP protocol stack.  Unfortunately, 
IPSec as mandatory as it is in IPv6 would do nothing to protect against this kind of attack 
since IPSec is a security protocol at layer 3.  Other security concerns are lack of overall 
understanding of IPv6 by security staff which may allow attackers to exploit IPv6 assets. 
Moreover, since IPv6 systems are not yet widely deployed in production environments, 
the possibility exists that the number of vulnerabilities in implementing IPv6 protocol can 
still increase as IPv6 networks are being massively deployed in the near future. 
 
2.3 CONCEPT OF TRUST AND REPUTATION IN PEER-TO-PEER 
NETWORKS 
2.3.1 Peer-to-Peer Network 
Peer-to-peer network is a type of network architecture in which a peer can act as a server 
and a client, as the peer can provide service as well as request for service from other 
peers.  In addition, there is no central authority or infrastructure that could coordinate the 
behaviour of peers.  Further, each peer makes autonomous decisions based on 
information received from its neighbours, and peer can join or leave the network as it 
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pleases.  Because of this dynamic and autonomous nature of P2P model, it is a great 
success in the Internet community, as Internet applications such as instant messaging, 
distributed processing and file sharing are built on top of peer-to-peer communication 
model.   
Stateless address auto-configuration technique of forming addresses in IPv6 networks 
also supports this communication paradigm, since new nodes intending to initialize their 
interfaces do not need to contact a server for address information.  A new peer forms a 
temporary address (i.e., link-local address) and goes through the duplicate address 
detection process to ascertain the usability of this address.  The platform of our work is 
therefore peer-to-peer.   
 
Despite all these great features of the peer-to-peer communication model, there are a 
number of security concerns that threaten its success.  First, since no peer has the power 
or duty of monitoring and restraining other peers’ behavior and second, each peer is 
anonymous, all of which means that interactions in a P2P takes place between stranger 
peers, some peers may decide to render malicious services such as sending unreal or fake 
information, and colluding with other peers to provide bad service. 
 
A malicious node or set of malicious nodes in an IPv6 networks may also frustrate the 
stateless address auto-configuration process if they always respond with a network 
advertisement message to a network solicitation message of an upcoming node.  The new 
may give up initializing its interface after a few other attempts at forming new link-local 
addresses and going the duplicate address detection.   
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One technique that we propose to deal with stateless auto-configuration threat in IPv6 
network is Trust and Reputation. 
 
2.3.2 Trust 
Jiang and Ye [40] define Trust for peer X to peer Y as an evaluation based on X’s history 
of interactions with Y, either directly with personal experience i.e. direct feedback, or as 
reported recommendations from other peers i.e. indirect feedbacks.  Josang et al [41] 
defines trust as a firm belief than an entity has about another entity from past experiences, 
knowledge about the entity’s nature and / or recommendations from trusted entities.  This 
belief is typically an expectation about the entity’s behavior. 
Some of the features of trust are – transitivity, composability, personalization, 
asymmetry, dynamism, context sensitivity [40]. 
Transitivity – When a peer A trusts in peer B, A should also trust B to make 
recommendations about other peers C, D and so on.  
Composability – a peer A receiving a number of recommendations about peer B from 
other peers should be able to combine all of the trust values in the received 
recommendations into a single belief (trust value) about B’s trustworthiness. For 
instance, if peer A receives recommendations about peer B from other peers 1, 2, 3 … k, 
then the combined trust value of B in A is: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  = 1𝑘𝑘  ∑  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  
And if each of peers i has different weights in A, then the trust value can be: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  = 1𝑘𝑘  ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖  .  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 , where wi ≥ 0 (∑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖  = 1) is the weight that 
peer A attaches to each of the recommendation trust values from peer i. 
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Asymmetry – The fact that peer A trusts another peer B does not mean peer B would 
trust peer A with the same trust value in both directions. 
Context Sensitive – Trust is a function of a specific context.  Peer A may trust peer B on 
very good file quality but may not trust recommendations from B about another peer C. 
 
2.4 SURVEY ON TRUST-BASED SCHEMES 
Grifith [25] presents a technique called MDT-R that allows peers to delegate and manage 
the risks of cooperating in a P2P network by using trust and recommendation of other 
peers.  The agents (peers) perceive the trustworthiness of fellow peers using the 
dimensions of Success, Cost, Timeliness and Quality.  The trust value is computed as a 
value in the interval [0 1] and is regularly updated using an Updatesuccess or Updatefail
In [26], Chu et al presented a reputation model which allows a peer to determine the 
reputation value of another peer, a scheme that enables the first peer in distinguishing 
peers providing good QoS from those providing poor QoS.  In determining the reputation 
value, the first peer uses the recommendations from its neighbour peers to hasten up the 
calculation for another peer, and also uses a trust mechanism to overcome the problem of 
malicious recommendation. 
 
function. 
 
The work done in [31] highlights a distributed node authentication scheme in wireless 
sensor networks which relies on public information and the majority rules. In this 
scheme, which does not require certified servers, every sensor node stores its neighbor’s 
identity and location information, such that a node A trying to determine the authenticity 
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of node B would only have to obtain this information from B's neighbours.  They were 
able to achieve a satisfying detection rates while keeping the false positive rates low 
despite the location inaccuracies in their localization algorithms. 
 
Ren et al [32] presents an improved trust model based on Bayesian trust model.  Their 
technique uses a logarithm approach to compute and update the trust for peers and a 
number of services, while preventing malicious peers from attacking legitimate peers.  
Their technique also prevents malicious peers from increasing their trust. 
 
Wu et al. [33] presented a trust model based on reputation in which they incorporated 
both trust and distrust using a polling algorithm.  Their proposal, which is a modified 
form of SupP2Prep [34], a protocol for management via polling in P2P networks, uses 
two amendments on the SupP2Prep protocol.  The first amendment is that peers in a P2P 
network are apportioned to different groups based on their interests and only members in 
the same group are permitted to vote.  And second, distrust is taken into account – the 
model considers voting of peers from the perspective of both trust and distrust.  In 
evaluating the trustworthiness of peers and to effectively deal with malicious behavior in 
P2P network, their model identified seven factors which are satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
degree in interactions, number of interactions, size of interactions, time, vote accuracy, 
punishment function, and risk.  
 
In [35] Chen et al proposed a reputation system to verify the trustworthiness of users and 
shared files.  Their work highlights several trust models such as Trust Model on Direct 
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Feedback, which determines the direct trust of peer X to peer Y using total transaction 
numbers between X and Y and good feedback numbers that X receives from Y at ith
 
 
transaction; Trust Metric with Aging Factor, which uses a decay function that assigns 
more weights to recent transaction and less weight to past transactions; and locally final 
trust model by combining the reputation and direct feedback. 
“NeighborTrust” is proposed by Gupta et al in [36].  As opposed to many schemes which 
attempt to calculate global trust and reputation value for each peer by keeping these 
values in a global trust matrix from which the values are communicated to all 
participating peers, NeighborTrust maintains trust for only neighbor peers thereby 
reducing communication and computational overhead for each peer.  In this protocol, the 
trust rating of a peer is linked with its privilege of establishing with establishing with 
existing peer and the rate at which the peer inject traffic into the network.  This idea gives 
an incentive to peers to maintain good behavior, hence, limiting the rate at which DDoS 
is experienced inside the network. The trust ratings for peers are also encrypted and 
transmitted using a middleware which prevents malicious nodes to manipulate their trust 
ratings. 
 
Jiang and Ye [37] also proposed a reputation-based scheme which has both direct and 
indirect feedback to prevent peers from distributing malicious contents into the network.  
In coming up with their scheme, they identified some of the common pitfalls made by 
researchers of reputation-based systems such as using direct feedback only without using 
recommendation from other peers, not differentiating the transaction period in computing 
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the trust value, and not including other factors such as number of transactions and 
credibility of direct feedback. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
A TRUST-BASED MECHANISM FOR PROTECTING IPV6 
NETWORKS AGAINST STATELESS ADDRESS AUTO-
CONFIGURATION ATTACKS 
 
3.1 PROPOSED TRUST SCHEME 
In this chapter, we present our trust-based technique for countering the effect of a node 
auto-configuration attack.  The proposed technique is based on distributed definition and 
confirmation of address uniqueness, and does not affect the flexibility provided by the 
address auto-configuration property of the IPv6 protocol. 
In our scheme, a new node joining an IPv6 network forms its link-local address from the 
concatenation of its interface identifier and link-prefix and attempts to confirm the 
usability of the link-local address by sending a multicast neighbour solicitation (NS) 
message (the NS message contains the link-local address) to all the nodes on the local 
link.  If there is no neighbour advertisement (NA) response to the new node’s NS 
message, this implies that its link-local address is unique and it can proceed to form a 
global address using its link-local address. 
However, if there is neighbour advertisement response from a node inside the network, 
the new node first extracts the IP address of the responding node from the neighbour 
advertisement message and then proceeds to verify the claim of the responding node by 
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finding out its trust value from its neighbours.  This new node does this by sending a 
second neighbour solicitation message containing the IP address of the claiming node 
(responding node) to all the neighbours of the responding node, requesting for its trust 
value in the network.  The new node establishes the trustworthiness of the claiming node 
by extracting the claiming node’s trust value from each of the neighbour advertisement 
responses and computing the aggregate trust value, which compares to a certain trust 
threshold.   
For our trust scheme, each node i in the network is assumed to have a list of k neighbours, 
where the value k and the exact neighbour list is randomly selected and defined at 
network initialization time.  The neighbour list for a given node i consists of all nodes 
which can confirm the existence of a link-local address in the network, if an advertised 
LLA request by an upcoming node (say w) is considered in use, based on an incorrect 
response received from a malicious node operating network. 
The following is a list of parameters used by the proposed scheme: 
i. ki
ii. Θ is the threshold on the minimum number of neighbour responses needed for 
node address verification. 
 is the number of trusted neigbours of an existing IPv6 node  i, where i is the 
node ID. 
iii. 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖→𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑  is the trust value between a node pair {i, j} during a given time epoch e. 
iv. N is the total number of nodes in the network. 
v. y is the number of legitimate nodes in the network. 
vi. N – y is the expected number of rogue nodes. 
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vii. α is the trust factor 
viii. τ is the optimal time window length 
The trust factor α is derived from the number of responses (network advertisement 
messages) received from k neighbours of a given node i, when a network solicitation 
message is sent.  The value of α is dependent on the window of time (which in turn is 
a function of the network size, number of hops and approximate round-trip delay), 
where α ϵ {0, 1}.   
Based on the dependencies defined, the decision factor, given by 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖→𝑗𝑗 , enables a 
requesting node to determine whether to trust a response (NA) coming from a node j, 
or not, and is provided by Equation 3.1. 
    𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖→𝑗𝑗   =  𝛼𝛼 .  𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖→𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑   +    𝛼𝛼�𝑁𝑁 – 𝑦𝑦�  .  𝜏𝜏   (3.1) 
If 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖→𝑗𝑗  >  θ, node i  trusts j, else it does not trust node j and starts afresh forming a 
new link-local address and sends another network solicitation message. 
In order to find the optimal window of time within which the k trustable responses 
(NA) need to be receive by the sender i, the differential of equation is equated to zero.  
Equation 3.2 best provides the maximized value of τ, to attain the maximum trust 
within a window of time of length 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖→𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑 . 
    𝜏𝜏 =   1
�𝑦𝑦  .(𝑁𝑁−𝑦𝑦).𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖→𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑        (3.2) 
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As shown in Figure 3.1, the time window (τ) within which an upcoming node i can 
expect a valid and verified response to its network advertisement (NA) message 
decreases with increasing number of good nodes y in the network. 
 
Fig. 3.1 The effect of increasing number of good nodes y on the value of τ 
In algorithm 3.1, we illustrate the steps of execution of the trust-based address 
verification scheme.   The steps of the algorithm are executed based on a response 
received to a new node address uniqueness request in the network. 
Basically, a new attempting to join a network forms its link-local address via stateless 
address auto-configuration and tries to verify its address uniqueness by multicasting a 
NewNodeLLARequest (corresponding to neighbour solicitation message) to all nodes 
on the local link.  If there is no response, the new node goes ahead to use its address.  
If there is a response, the new node sends another NewNodeLLARequest message to 
all the k neighbours of the responding node.  The new node uses τ as the time window 
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within which it expects a response to the NewNodeLLARequest message.  From the 
response to the second NewNodeLLARequest message, the new node extracts the 
trust information of the claiming node from its k neighbours, computes the aggregate 
trust value and then compares it with a certain threshold.  With this, the new node can 
ascertain if claim of the responding is genuine or not. 
 
1. Determine the optimal value of τ 
2.  foreach NewNodeLLARequest do 
      Address multicast: n →  N 
    foreach 𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛  do 
  Determine 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛  
    end 
    foreach 𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛  do 
  If 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖→𝑗𝑗  > θ, then 
   𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖→𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑 = 1 
  end 
  else  
   𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖→𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑 = 0 
  end 
     end 
     end 
Algorithm 3.1: Proposed Trust Algorithm 
 
3.2 SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS 
The simulator for testing the effectiveness of our proposed trust-based attack 
detection mechanism was written in MATLAB.  The parameters defined for the 
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scheme above were varied and their corresponding effects on the outcome of the 
simulations were analyzed. 
Figures 3.2 – 3.7 provide an insight of the effect of increasing number of trusted 
neighbours in the network, on the trust factor 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖→𝑗𝑗 ,  for varying numbers of trusted 
nodes in the network, i.e. values of y.  Each graph represents a network of a different 
value of N, namely, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500 and 800.  A new node in an IPv6 network 
goes ahead with using its LLA if there is no neighbour advertisement response to its 
neighbour advertisement request containing the temporary address. 
However, if there is a response, the node depends on the trust value 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖→𝑗𝑗  generated by 
any node i in the network, willing to perform address verification on behalf of the 
new node.  With increasing numbers of legitimate nodes in the network, there is a 
lesser chance for a malicious node to influence the trust value in the network 
advertisement message exchanged in the network and thus the requesting node could 
reliably accept the trust value issued by the resolving node i. 
As observed from the graphs, the effect of increasing network size on the scheme is 
negligible, thus attesting to the scalability of the proposed scheme.   
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In Figure 3.8, we illustrate the delay experienced by the network advertisement 
messages, based on the network size.  The general trend in the plots is that as the 
number of nodes in the network increases, so does the delay.  This occurs because of 
the increasing number of messages exchanged in the network, with increasing number 
of nodes, for a fixed value of k = 10%.N.  Similarly, the size of the network has a 
direct relationship with the number of hops and as such delays are higher in 500-node 
and 800-node networks when compared with smaller networks.  However, as the trust 
values in the messages exchanged in the network increase (i.e. caused by the higher 
proportion of good nodes), the delay experienced by the messages is less.  Therefore, 
increasing value of α, has a corresponding effect on the incurred delay. 
 
Fig. 3.8 The effect of increasing network size on the delay incurred by the address 
verification scheme, for varying values of α 
0 200 400 600 800 1000
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
netw ork size
D
el
ay
, T
 
 
α = 0.4
α = 0.6
α = 0.8
0 200 400 600 800 1000
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
netw ork size
D
el
ay
, T
 
 
α = 0.4
α = 0.6
α = 0.8
0 200 400 600 800 1000
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
netw ork size
D
el
ay
, T
 
 
α = 0.4
α = 0.6
α = 0.8
0 200 400 600 800 1000
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
netw ork size
D
el
ay
, T
 
 
α = 0.4
α = 0.6
α = 0.8
 42 
 
This occurs because with higher number of legitimate nodes in the network, the 
neighbour list consisting of k neighbours for each node i, will include nodes in close 
proximity to i.   As a result, the performance of the scheme is seen to improve with 
increasing values of α.  It may be noted that the values of α is directly proportional to the 
number of legitimate nodes y in the network. 
 
3.3 CONCLUSION   
We present in this chapter a trust-based approach that enables a new node with stateless 
auto-configured address attempting to join a network to detect a malicious claim by a 
rogue node which tries to claim ownership of the new node’s address.  The new node 
achieves this by getting the trust information of the rogue node from its neighbours and 
then computes the aggregate trust information of the rogue node.   
The scheme assumes that every k neighbour a node i in the network is trustworthy and as 
a result, the new node can assume that the trust information it is getting from the 
neighbour advertisement message for a node is true.  However, in the presence of several 
colluding nodes i.e. when the some or all of the k neighbours of a node are malicious, the 
scheme could fail, since malicious node would never be detected by the new node is 
trying to verify the claim of the malicious node. 
 
3.4 ACCOMPLISHMENT 
This chapter of the thesis was published in the proceedings of the 17th IEEE International 
Conference of Networks that held during 14th – 16th December, 2011 in Singapore.     
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CHAPTER 4 
MSB / LSB SCHEME 
 
IPv6 protocol introduces a new auto-configuration technique by which nodes could 
initiate their interfaces in a network without the need of a static configuration by an 
administrator or by using a DHCP server.  The node forms an address combining 
information from routers inside a network and that from its physical address.   In the 
process of ascertaining the usability of this address, malicious nodes inside the network 
could subvert this auto-configuration mechanism if they continue to respond with a 
network advertisement message portraying that the address formed by the new node is in 
use.   
In this chapter, we design and implement an MSB / LSB scheme which uses the last 24 
bits of a new node LLA, to ease the process of node address verification and to contain 
any malicious node that may attempt to frustrate the auto-configuration technique. 
 
4.1    TERMINOLOGY 
♦ Unspecified Address: a reserved address value that indicates the lack of an 
address (i.e. the address is unknown).  It is never used as a destination address, 
but may be used as a source address if the sender does not (yet) know its own 
address (for instance, when verifying an address is unused during stateless address 
auto-configuration). 
 The unspecified address has a value of 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 or :: 
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♦ Link-local Address: a unicast address having link-only scope that can be used to 
reach neighbours.  All interfaces on routers must have link-local address.  
Interfaces on hosts are also required to have link-local address. 
 
♦ Address Auto-configuration and Address Resolution:  Address auto-
configuration introduces the mechanisms needed in order to allow nodes to 
configure an address for an interface in a stateless manner while Address 
Resolution is used by a node to determine the link-layer address of an on-link 
destination (e.g. neighbour) given only the destination’s IP address. 
 
♦ Duplicate Address Detection (DAD): Duplicate address detection is a 
mechanism which allows a node to determine whether or not an address it wishes 
to use is already in use by another node. 
 
4.2     EUI-64 AND THE NEIGHBOUR DISCOVERY PROTOCOL 
When sending a packet from a node A to another node B and given that the host part of 
an address embeds the MAC address, a node A might just extract the MAC address from 
the IPv6 address of the destination B and then use the MAC address as the destination 
layer 2 frame address.  This would avoid the need for the neighbour solicitation and 
advertisement process, the duplicate address detection and it would be faster.  However, 
for the reasons below, a source node may not want to do this: 
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- The fact that a node has an address that looks like an EUI-64 does not 
necessarily mean that the MAC address is there. 
- Some link-layers do not have unique MAC address addresses. 
- There is not necessarily a one-to-one relationship between the MAC and the 
IPv6 address. 
- Nodes are also using manually assigned addresses or temporary addresses, 
which have no EUI-64 part.  These addresses must use neighbour discovery 
- It is safer to implement this mechanism for all addresses to avoid duplicate 
addresses on the same link 
- The cost of initial neighbour solicitation / advertisement exchange is low 
compared to the safety guard it provides. 
- If multiple addresses on the same interface use the EUI-64 from the same 
MAC addresses, implementation can choose to make the neighbour solicitation 
only on the first one and skip for others, increasing the efficiency of the 
neighbour solicitation and advertisement process. 
 
4.3   STATELESS ADDRESS AUTO-CONFIGURATION ATTACK DETECTION:  
MSB / LSB TECHNIQUE 
This scheme uses only the last 24 bits corresponding to the last 6 hex letters of a link-
local address for verification.  In this scheme, the new node does not send its newly 
formed link-local address inside the payload of a network solicitation message during the 
duplicate address detection stage.  Rather, it only sends a part of its link-local address 
string and tries to find out which of its neighbour peer nodes shares this string in their 
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link-local address.  The ending 24 bit string of the new node’s address is however divided 
into two parts – the most significant bit (MSB) and the least significant bit (LSB).  The 
new node inserts the LSB into the payload of the neighbour solicitation message and 
multicasts the NS message to all the nodes on the link, during the duplicate address 
detection stage, asking any of these nodes whose last part of its LLA address tallies with 
the LSB to send their full IP address when responding with their neighbour advertisement 
messages.   
The main idea behind this scheme is that a receiving peer of the NS message should not 
have access to the link-local address of the new node.  With this, a responding neighbour 
peer, if malicious, would not be able to act as if it is the owner of the LLA.  So, a 
neighbour peer whose link-local address that shares the LSB string with the new node, 
would respond including its link-local address and MAC address inside its neighbour 
advertisement message. 
The format of the neighbour solicitation message sent by the new node therefore is 
illustrated in Figure 4.1: 
Source MAC 
Neighbour Solicitation message 
Source IP Destination 
MAC 
Destination IP Payload 
-          :: 
(unspecified 
address) 
              -    All-nodes 
multicast address  
LSB of the 
last 24 bits 
of its LLA 
 
Fig. 4.1 Format of MSB / LSB Neighbour Solicitation message 
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In the NS message, both the Source MAC and the destination MAC fields are empty.  
The destination MAC field is empty since the message is being sent to all the existing 
nodes in the network, so no specific IPv6 node is targeted – the target is all the nodes on 
the local link.  The Source MAC field is empty because the new does not want any 
existing node to guess its IP since the link-local address is typically derived from the 
MAC address.  Source IP address field is unspecified (::) as the new node has not 
validated its newly formed address.    
The format of neighbour advertisement is as shown in Figure 4.2: 
 
Source MAC 
Neighbour Advertisement message 
Source IP Destination 
MAC 
Destination IP Payload 
Link layer 
address of 
responding node 
Link-local 
address of 
responding node 
              -       All-node 
multicast 
address (ff02::1) 
Its LLA  
 
Fig. 4.2 Format of MSB / LSB Neighbour Advertisement message   
 
In the NA message, the destination MAC field is empty of the NA message is also being 
sent to all the nodes on the local link.  
Upon receipt of an NA or a number of NAs to its NS message, the new node checks the 
source IP fields of the NAs to see if any of them matches with its own.  If there is no 
match, the new node goes ahead to use its address.  Otherwise, it sends another NS 
message with different payload information.  
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The number of bits inside the LSB string, m, is varied by the new node from 1 bit to 13 
(just a bit more than half of the total string) while the MSB takes the remaining part.  
During duplicate address detection stage, the new node inserts the LSB into the payload 
field of the NS message and multicasts it to the all-node multicast address which would 
be received by all nodes on the local link.  All nodes whose last part of their LLAs 
matches with the LSB respond with NAs including their LLAs. 
The new node constructs a list of the respondent nodes alongside their IPv6 addresses 
(LLAs) and tries to see if its IP address is in the list.  If not, the new node considers its 
address unique and goes on using its address.  If the new node’s address is found in this 
list however, the new node forms another address by first randomly picking any MSB 
string from the possible 224-m
However, if there is a match between the LLA of the new node and that of a responding 
node, the new node proceeds to generate another address choosing any one of the 
remaining 2
 MSB string combinations (m is the number of bits in the 
LSB) and then concatenating the chosen MSB string with the used LSB.  This 
combination guarantees that a different link-local address is formed.  The new node goes 
through the duplicate address detection again with the new address. For our work, we 
considered cases where m, the number of bits in the LSB string is varied from 1 to 13. 
24-m
 
 potential addresses (m is number of bits in the LSB), concatenating it 
with its LSB. This new combination would be the last 24 bits of its LLA, and should be 
unique.  So the new node goes through the Duplicate Address Detection process again. 
4.4  THE PROPOSED MSB / LSB ALGORITHM 
Input: {new node’s LLA, a set of random IPv6 neighbour peers, LSBs of the last 24  
 bits of peers’ LLAs} 
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Output: {list of LLAs of responding nodes, new node’s decision to use address} 
1. New node forms an LLA 
2. The new node extracts the last 24 bits of its LLA and divides it into MSB and 
LSB  
3. The new node constructs an NS and multicasts it to all the nodes on the link, 
encapsulating the LSB inside the payload of the NS 
4. All existing nodes with a match with the LSB of the new node will respond with 
an NA message including their LLAs within their respective NA payloads. 
5. New node searches from list of respondent addresses to check for a match with its 
LLA.   
6. If no match 
      Address is considered unique and new node joins the network with this LLA 
END 
7. Else 
a. Selects a new LSB from the pool of remainder addresses (i.e., from the 
remaining 224 – m
b. Constructs a new LLA based on the new LSB. 
 addresses), where m = Number of intended LSB bits, 
defined at network initialization time.  
c. Go to Step 3. 
8. end 
Algorithm 4.1 Proposed MSB / LSB Scheme 
 
4.5 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP    
We illustrate the MSB / LSB scheme with a simple IPv6 network of random peer nodes 
in which a new node with a link-local address of fe80::0212:6bff:fe3a:9e9a attempts to 
join the network.  The last 6 hex letters of the new node ‘3a9e9a’ corresponding to 
‘001110101001111010011010’ divided into binary strings of MSB and LSB. The 
number of bits inside the LSB sting is varied by the new node from 1 bit to 13 (just a bit 
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more than half of the total string) while the MSB takes the remaining part.  During 
duplicate address detection stage, the new node inserts the LSB into the payload field of 
the NS message and multicasts it to the all-node multicast address which would be 
received by all nodes on the local link.  All nodes whose last part of their LLAs matches 
with the LSB respond with NAs including their LLAs. 
The new node constructs a list of the respondent peers alongside their IPv6 addresses 
(LLAs) and tries to see if its IP address is in the list.  If not, the new node considers its 
address unique and goes on using its address.  If the new node’s address is found in this 
list however, the new node forms another address by first randomly picking any MSB 
string from the possible 224-m
For our work, we considered cases where m, the number of bits in the LSB string is 
varied from 1 to 13, and equally perform a simulation with random set of IPv6 neigbour 
peers on the local link with the new nodes.   
 MSB string combinations (m is the number of bits in the 
LSB) and then concatenating the chosen MSB string with the used LSB.  This 
combination guarantees that a different link-local address is formed.  The new node goes 
through the duplicate address detection again with the new address. 
 
4.6 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
To test the performance of the proposed scheme for detection of duplicate addresses, and 
to verify the correctness of all NA responses received by a new node, the scheme needs 
to be analyzed in the context of varying network and application parameters. Following is 
a list of parameters that will affect the performance of the scheme: 
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y = number of legitimate nodes  
N = total network size 
K = N – y = number of rogue nodes 
L = number of LSB bits used  
α = number of responses 
τ = time window (duration) between neighbour solicitation and neighbour 
advertisement 
The number of legitimate nodes in the network, y, is a system parameter that is varied for 
analysis of the scheme under the presence of diverse adversarial classes. For instance, a 
network which has witnessed a large number of recent malicious attacks, in particular, 
duplicate address attacks, will have a lower value of y, as opposed to networks with 
infrequent attack instances. The size of the network is defined as the total number of 
nodes operational in the network at any point in time. The analysis of the scheme may 
generate outcomes that are directly affected by the size of the network. We do not 
consider the topological aspects of the network, but rather assume that the IPv6 network 
is constituted of nodes that are reachable by any new node intending to join the network.  
K is defined as the number of rogue nodes in the network. This value is simply a 
difference between the total number of nodes in the network and the number of legitimate 
nodes.  
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L is the number of LSB bits employed by the new node in the payload of the NS 
message.  This has an impact on the number of NA responses α, from the existing nodes 
inside the network 
The total number of responses received i.e., total number of NAs, to an NS of a new node 
is represented through α.  
This TTD is the delay that the system can tolerate for the convergence of the entire 
detection scheme. If the delay exceeds W then the advantage of detecting is 
overshadowed by the overhead that the scheme will incur. If the delay is less than W then 
the scheme is efficient enough to perform the detection so as to be of any value to the 
purpose i.e. attack detection. 
The total tolerable delay for the MSB / LSB scheme is given as: 
W = (N-y).L / τ + τ α N    (4.1) 
If the total number of rogue nodes (hypothetically) is large, then the delay will be high, as 
it is anticipated that in the duplicate address attack, most if not all rogue nodes will 
respond to the NS with an NA. On the contrary, if K is small, then the effective delay will 
be low. Second, for large values of L the expected number of responses will be low, since 
fewer numbers of nodes will be having an overlapping address with that of the new node 
in this case. If the value of L is small, then more number of nodes will be having 
overlapping bit sequences in their respective addresses with the new nodes’ address. In 
such a scenario, the total number of responses to the NS will be high. Therefore, the 
overall delay will be high. The length of the time window (τ) is inversely proportional to 
the number of rogue nodes in the network as well as to the length of the LSB.  Increasing 
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number of responses to the NS will incur higher delays as opposed to receiving fewer 
responses. Therefore, increasing value of α will have a non-decreasing effect on the 
overall delay of the scheme. Larger the network more will be the expected number of NA 
responses to a given NS. The length of the time window is directly proportional to the 
values of both N and α.  
When Equation (4.1) is differentiated with respect to τ, Equation (4.2) best describes an 
expression for the minimum time window within which a neighbour advertisement 
response is expected to a neighbour solicitation is sent: 
τ = �
𝑁𝑁 ∝
𝐾𝐾 𝐿𝐿       (4.2) 
4.7 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Results in Figure 4.3 depict a network configuration of 100 nodes with several 
compositions of malicious nodes.  In this scenario, percentages of malicious nodes to 
total network size were varied from 10% to 25%. 
A new node joining the network with a neighbour solicitation message multicast on the 
local link experiences some time delays of the order of τ (in microsecond) before it 
receives neighbour advertisement messages from the nodes claiming the ownership of the 
new node’s link-local address.  With a number of malicious nodes inside the network, the 
amount of neighbour advertisement messages received by the new nodes are measured as 
a percentage of the total network size. 
The impact of the increasing proportion of malicious nodes is felt on the time window 
length.  If the whole network is constituted of 10% malicious nodes as in Figure 4.3, the 
time window length experienced by a new node between its neighbour solicitation and 
 54 
 
neighbour advertisement response(s) is about 3 µs.  The new node collects all the 
neighbour advertisement message responses and compares its address with those of 
claiming nodes.  If the network contains 25% malicious nodes, the time window 
experienced by the new node is 8 µs. 
 
Figure 4.4 shows a 200-node network.  Since it is a larger network than that of figure 4.3 
and consequently with more number of malicious nodes, a new node joining this network 
experiences a delay of 8.5µs when there are only 10% of the neighbour advertisement 
responses are coming from the malicious nodes.  With more percentages of the total 
network size being constituted by malicious nodes and hence greater responses coming 
from malicious nodes, the delays increase.  In addition, it took a longer time for the 
network to converge.  
 
 
Figure 4.3 Plot of time window vs number of neighbour advertisement messages, N = 
100   
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Fig. 4.4 Plot of time window vs number of neighbour advertisement messages, N = 200   
 
 
Fig. 4.5 Plot of time window vs number of neighbour advertisement messages, N = 300 
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Fig. 4.6 Plot of time window vs number of neighbour advertisement messages, N = 400 
 
 
Fig. 4.7 Plot of time window vs number of neighbour advertisement messages, N = 500 
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neighbour advertisement messages to process from both legitimate nodes and malicious 
nodes after sending its neighbour solicitation request on the local link. 
 
 
Fig. 4.8 Plot of time window vs number of neighbour advertisement messages, N = 800 
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With more number of LSB bits, the number of IP address matches of the new node with 
those of existing nodes is far less.  This also leads to less number of neighbour 
advertisement responses from existing nodes which translates to less overhead on the 
network. 
 
 
Fig. 4.9 Plot of time window vs number of neighbour advertisement messages, N = 100, 
L = 3 
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Fig. 4.10 Plot of time window vs number of neighbour advertisement messages, N = 200, 
L = 3 
 
 
Fig. 4.11 Plot of time window vs number of neighbour advertisement messages, N = 800, 
L = 3 
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4.8 CONCLUSION 
Besides the fact that the proposed MSB / LSB scheme is effective in verifying the claim 
of responding peers when a new node in an IPv6 network is undergoing the duplicate 
address detection and helps prevents a denial of service, the benefit of this technique also 
lies in the fact that: 
i. It helps reduce the overhead as the number of responses keeps decreasing to 
zero when a higher number of LSB bits is employed. 
ii. It is a powerful means by which a new node can authenticate the claims of 
other peer nodes without revealing the information it is attempting to verify. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
5.1 CONCLUSION 
The main focus of this thesis is to propose and implement techniques that would prevent 
malicious nodes from denying a legitimate node in initializing its interface when joining 
an IPv6 network. 
Two approaches were proposed.  The first approach is a reputation-based technique 
which involves the determination of aggregate trust of nodes inside a network.  The 
aggregate trust is calculated from the neighbours of every inside the network, and it is 
included inside the neighbour advertisement a joining node receives in response to its 
neighbour solicitation message sent to the k neighbours of the malicious node. 
This scheme, however, assumes that each node inside the network is surrounded by some 
random trustworthy k neighbours from which the aggregate trust of a node is determined. 
The second approach is the MSB / LSB scheme which uses information hiding concept to 
verify the claim of a malicious node.  In this scheme, the joining node only discloses 
some of its features as the LSB inside the payload of its neighbour solicitation message 
and requests any nodes that have the LSB match to send their full IPv6 addresses inside 
their neighbour advertisement messages. 
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While the reputation scheme may fail based on the assumption that every node is has 
some k trustworthy random neighbours, an assumption that may not hold all the time, 
especially if some of the neighbour nodes later become malicious, the second scheme, 
however, is not constrained by this shortcoming. 
In all simulation scenarios in the MSB / LSB scheme, no node inside the network is 
aware of the link-local address of the joining node and for this reason, it is difficult for 
any malicious node to spoof the joining node’s address. 
In addition, simulation results also showed that there were no responses to a joining 
node’s neighbour solicitation message request before some 30% of the LSB bit are used 
for authentication. 
And even in a very rare case of any response, the joining node can still choose any MSB 
bit stream out of 224-m 
 
space (m is the number of LSB bits), concatenating it with the LSB 
bit stream and goes through the duplicate address detection process again. 
 5.2 FUTURE WORK 
In this work, different IPv6 network configurations were simulated with only one node 
attempting to join the network.  As part of our future work, we intend to study scenarios 
where more than one node is joining the network at the same time.  
 
 
 63 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] S. Deering and R. Hinden, “Internet Protocol Version 6 Specification,” Internet 
Engineering Task Force RFC 2460, 1998. 
[2] L. Ladid, “The Next Big Bail-Out: Will IPv6 save the Internet?” in proceedings of 
CompSysTech International Conference on Computer Systems, Technologies and 
Workshop for PhD students in computing, 2009. 
[3] J. Govil, J. Govil, N. Kaur, and H. Kaur, “An Examination of IPv4 and IPv6 
Networks: Constraints and Various Transition Mechanisms,” in proceedings of 
Southeastcon conference, 2008, pp. 178-185.  
[4] R. Kaur and R. Maini, “Study of various issues of Internet Protocol Version 6,” in 
International Journal of Computer Applications, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2010, pp. 19-23. 
[5] “IPv6 Security Issues,” URL: 
www.infosecwriters.com/text_resources/pdf/IPv6_SSotillo.pdf, Accessed on 20 
[6] C. Partridge, A. W. Arsenault, and S.T. Kent, “Information Assurance and the 
Transition to IP Version 6 (IPv6),” in proceedings of IEEE Military 
Communication Conference, 2007, pp. 1-8. 
February, 2012. 
[7] M. Blanchet, “Migrating to IPv6 – a practical guide to implementing IPv6 in mobile 
and fixed networks”, John Wiley and Sons, 2006. 
 64 
 
[8] X. Yang, T. Ma, and Y. Shi, “Typical DoS/DDoS threats under IPv6,” in 
proceedings of the International Multi-Conference on Computing in the Global 
Information Technology, 2007, pp. 55-60. 
[9] R. Droms, J. Bound, B. Voltz, T. Lemon, C. Perkins and M. Carney, “Dynamic 
Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6),” Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) RFC 3315, July 2003. 
[10] C. E. Perkins, and J. Bound, “DHCP for IPv6”, in proceedings of the IEEE 
Symposium on Computers and Communications, 2002, pp. 493-497. 
[11] C. E. Caicedo, J. B. D. Joshi, and S. R. Tuladha, “IPv6 Security Challenges,” in 
Journal of Computer, Vol. 42, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 36-42. 
[12] T. Narten, “Neigbour Discovery and Stateless Auto-configuration in IPv6,” in 
Journal of IEEE Internet Computing, Vol. 3, Issue 4, 1999, pp. 54-62. 
[13] J. J. Silva Tobella, M. Stiemerling, and M. Bruner, “Towards Self-Configuration of 
IPv6 Networks,” in Networks Operations and Management Symposium, 2004, pp. 
895-896. 
[14] D. J. Wilson and R. Dragnea, “IPv6 in Fixed and Mobile Networks,” Alcatel 
Telecommunication Review, 2004, pp. 1-7.  
[15] M. Kim and D. Seo, “The study of secure auto-configuration Technology in IPv6,” 
in proceedings of 7th International Conference on Advanced Communication 
Technology, 2005, pp. 85-88. 
 65 
 
[16] R. Radhakrishnan, M. Jamil, S. Mehfuz, and M. Moinudin, “Security issues in 
IPv6,” in proceedings of 3rd
[17] E. Durdagi and A. Buldu, “IPv4 / IPv6 security and threat comparisons,” in 
Procedia Social and Behavioural Sciences, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 2010, pp. 5285-5291. 
 International Conference on Networking and Services, 
2007,  pp. 110-115. 
[18] D. Yang, X. Song, and Q. Guo, “Security on IPv6,” in 2nd
[19] J. Bi, J. Wu, and X. Leng, “IPv4 / IPv6 Transition Technologies and Univers6 
Architecture,” International Journal of Computer Science and Network Security, 
Vol. 7, No. 1, 2007, pp. 232-343. 
 International Conference 
on Advanced Computer Control, 2010, pp. 323-326.  
[20] M. Cooper and D. C. Yen, “IPv6: business applications and implementation 
concerns,” in Journal of Computers and Electrical Engineering, Vol. 33, Issue 5-6, 
2007, pp. 425-437.  
[21] P. Hunter, “IPv6: Security Issues,” Network Security, 2004, pp. 17-19. 
[22] J. Mohacsi, “IPv6 Security: Threats and Solutions,” Information Society 
Technologies, 2005.  
[23] S. Szigeti and P. Risztics, “Will IPv6 Bring Better Security,” in the proceedings of 
the 30th
 [24] D. Zagar and K. Grgic, “IPv6 Security threats and Possible Solutions,” in 
proceedings of World Automation Congress, 2006, pp. 1-7. 
 EUROMICRO Conference, 2004, pp. 532-537. 
 66 
 
[25] N. Griffiths, “Enhancing Peer-to-Peer Collaboration using Trust,” in Journal of 
Expert Systems and Applications, Vol. 31, Issue 4, 2006, pp. 849-858.  
[26] X. Chu, X. Chen, K. Zhao and J. Liu, “Reputation and Trust Management in 
Heterogeneous Peer-toPeer networks,” in Journal of Telecommunication Systems, 
Vol. 31, No. 3-4, 2010, pp. 191-203. 
[27] The Internet Protocol Specification, Internet Engineering Task Force RFC 791, 
1981. 
[28] B. J. Nickels, “An Introduction to Investigating IPv6 Networks,” in Journal of 
Digital Investigation, Vol. 4, Issue 2, 2007, pp.  59 – 67. 
[29] R. Hinden and S. Deering, “IPv6 Addressing Architecture,” Internet Engineering 
Task Force RFC 4291, 2006. 
[30] E. Fgee, J. Kenney, W. J. Phillips, W. Robertson and S. Sivakumar, “Implementing 
an IPv6 QoS management scheme using flow label and class of service fields,” in 
proceedings of Canadian Conference of Electrical and Computer Engineering 
CCEC, 2004, pp. 1049-1052. 
[31] Q. Zang, X. Zhou and F. Yang, “Distributed Node Authentication in Wireless 
Sensor Networks,” in proceedings of 2nd
[32] X. Ren, K. Li, R. Li and L. Yang, “An Improved Trust Model in P2P,” in 
proceedings of Asia-Pacific Conference on Services Computing, 2006, pp. 76-81. 
 International Conference on Future 
Computer and Communication,  2010, pp. 72-76. 
 67 
 
[33] X. Wu, J. He and F. Xu, “An enhanced trust model based on reputation for P2P 
networks,” in proceedings of International Conference on Sensor Networks, 
Ubiquitous and Trustworthy Computing, Taichung, China, June 2008, pp. 67-73.  
[34] S. Chhabra, E. Damiani, S. Paraboschi and P. Samarati, “A protocol for reputation 
management in super-peer networks,” in proceedings of 15th
[35] J. Chen, X. Xu and S. Bruda, “Combining Data Trust in Reputation Systems to 
Boost P2P Security,” in proceedings of 2
 International 
Workshop on Database and Expert Systems and Applications, Zaragosa, Spain, 
August 2004, pp. 973-983. 
nd
[36] A. Gupta, D. Malhotra, and L.K. Awasthi, “NeighborTrust: A Trust-based scheme 
for Countering Distributed Denial-Of-Service Attacks in P2P Networks,” in 
proceedings of 16
 International Conference on Future 
Computer and Communication (ICFCC), Wuhan, May 2010, pp. 194 –199  
th
[37] X. Jiang and L. Ye, “Reputation-based Trust Model and Anti-Attack Mechanism in 
P2P Networks,” in proceedings of 2
 IEEE International Conference on Networks, New Delhi, India, 
Dec. 2008, pp. 1-6. 
nd
[38] M.A. Badamchizadeh, A.A. Chianeh, “Security in IPv6,” in proceedings of the 5
 International Conference on Network 
Security, Wireless Communications, and Trusted Computing, 2010, pp. 498-501. 
th 
WSEAS International Conference on Signal Processing, Istanbul, Turkey, May 
2006, pp. 249-254. 
 68 
 
[39] S. Frankel, R. Graveman, J. Pearce, and M. Rooks, “Guidelines for secure 
deployment of IPv6 – Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology,” United States Department of Commerce, National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, Dec. 2010. 
[40] X. Jiang, L. Ye, “Attack-Resistant Techniques in P2P Reputation Systems,” in 
proceedings of 2nd
[41] A. Josang, R. Ismail and C. Boyd, “A Survey of Trust and Reputation systems for 
online service provision,”  in International Journal of Decision Support Systems, 
Vol. 43, Issue 2, March 2007, pp. 618-644.  
 International Conference on Networking and Digital Society, 
China, June 2010, pp. 390-393. 
[42] D. Zagar, K. Grgic and S. Rimac-Drlje, “Security Aspects in IPv6 networks – 
implementation and testing,” in Journal of Computers and Electrical Engineering, 
Vol. 33, Issue 5-6, 2007, pp. 425-437. 
[43] IPv6 and IPv4 Threat Comparison and Best-Practice Evaluation (v1.0), URL: 
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/security_services/ciag/documents/v6-v4-
threats.pdf, Accessed on 20 
[44] C. Douligeris and D. N. Serpanos, “Network Security – Current Status and Future 
Directions,” IEEE Press, A. John Wiley and Sons, NJ, 2007.  
February, 2012. 
[45] S. Hogg and E. Vyncke, “IPv6 Security – Protection measures for the next Internet 
Protocol,” Cisco Press, Indianapolis, 2009.  
 69 
 
[46] S. Convery and D. Miller, “IPv6 and IPv4 Threat Comparison and Best Practice 
Evaluation (v1.0),” 
Url:http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/security_services/ciag/documents/v6-
v4-threats.pdf, Accessed on 20 
[47] “Man-in-the-middle Attacks – Helping to eliminate the threat without impacting the 
business,” Url: http://www.techrepublic.com/whitepapers/man-in-the-middle-
attacks-helping-to-eliminate-the-threat-without-impacting-the-business/975615, 
Accessed on 20 February 2012 
February, 2012 
[48] M. Jensen, N. Gruschka and N. Luttenberger, “The Impact of Flooding Attacks on 
Networked Services,” in International Conference on Availability, Reliability and 
Security, 2008, pp. 509-513. 
[49] G. Carl, G. Kesidis, R.R. Brooks and S. Rai, “Denial-of-Service Attacks Detection 
Techniques,” in Journal of IEEE Internet Computing, Vol. 10, Issue 1, 2006, pp. 
82-89. 
[50] M. Alhabeeb, X. Wu, A. Almuhaideb, P. D. Le and B. Srinivasan, “Holistic 
Approach for Crititical System Security: Flooding Prevention,” in the 6th
[51] G. An, K. Kim, J. Jang, and Y. Jean, “Analysis of SEND Protocol through 
implementation and Simulation,” in proceedings of IEEE Conference on 
Convergence Information Technology, 2007, pp. 670-676. 
 
International Conference on Networked Computing, South Korea, 2010, pp. 1-8. 
 
 
 70 
 
VITA 
 
Suli Adeniye had his Bachelor’s degree in Computer Engineering at the Obafemi 
Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria.  After the mandatory one-year national service 
program in 2005, he worked as a Telecom Engineer in Telnet Nigeria Limited where he 
resigned to join the Master’s program in Computer Engineering at the King Fahd 
University of Petroleum and Minerals, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which he completed in 
2012. 
 
Please address correspondence to: 
Name:  Suli Adeniye 
Present Address:  2nd
Nationality:  Nigerian 
 Street, By Crown Plaza Hotel, Thukbah, Eastern Region, Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia   
Permanent Address:  5, Alhaji Saka Street, Behind Union Bank Plc, Ogere Remo, Ogun 
State, Nigeria. 
Mobile Numbers:  +966552339150, +2348028434090 
 Email: suliadeniye@gmail.com 
 
